by Patrick Colbeck at Let’s Fix Stuff
The long-awaited Michigan Auditor General Report on the Michigan Bureau of Elections was released on March 4, 2022. The report was requested March 3, 2021 by Michigan Representative Julie Alexander.
There were four objectives specified in the report:
- To assess the sufficiency of BOE’s efforts to maintain the integrity of the QVF
- To assess the effectiveness of selected application access controls over QVF and the Electronic Poll Book
- To assess the sufficiency of selected BOE post-election audit procedures to help ensure the integrity of elections.
- To assess the sufficiency of BOE’s efforts to establish and provide training to the county, city, and township officials who are responsible for conducting elections
As someone who has examined the aftermath of Michigan’s election operations under Director Jonathan Brater, I was hoping to shed some additional insights into Bureau of Election operations. Furthermore, I would like to address the sufficiency of the Auditor General’s report in addressing the evidence of election fraud discovered as a result of the 2020 General Election.
In essence, I have audited the Auditor General’s audit of the Bureau of Elections audit procedures.
AUDIT COMPARISONS
Objectives | Auditor General Conclusion | Auditor General Findings | Let’s Fix Stuff Conclusion | Let’s Fix Stuff Findings |
To assess the sufficiency of BOE’s efforts to maintain the integrity of the QVF | Sufficient, with exceptions | FINDING 1: BOE did not perform a periodic reconciliation between the driver’s license file and QVF. We identified discrepancies in addresses and death status that if identified and corrected could help decrease the risk of ineligible electors voting in Michigan. OBSERVATION 1: Legislative clarification may be needed related to ballots cast prior to an election day by electors who are deceased on election day. |
Insufficient | FINDING 1: MI SoS violated the following state statutes regarding the integrity of the QVF data. FINDING 2: Poor QVF data integrity. |
To assess the effectiveness of selected application access controls over QVF and the Electronic Poll Book | Effective | FINDING 2: Improved EPB security configuration controls are needed to ensure appropriate access and protect elector information. | Insufficient | OBSERVATION 1: Conflicts with findings of the Michigan Election Security Advisory Commission. FINDING 3: MI SoS ordered deletion of Pollbook software in violation of federal law. |
To assess the sufficiency of selected BOE post-election audit procedures to help ensure the integrity of elections. | Sufficient, with exceptions | FINDING 3: Post-election audit results were not properly submitted for approximately 9% of selected audits and 10% of the submissions were late. In addition, approximately 17% of completed post-election audits did not include a hand count of the appropriate statewide race ballots. OBSERVATION 2: Enhanced requirements in the Michigan Election Law and BOE policies and procedures could help improve the effectiveness of post-election audits. OBSERVATION 3: Observations from clerk site visits and survey results could help improve Michigan’s election processes. |
Insufficient, with exceptions | FINDING 4: The audit did not address the importance of analyzing the election record chain of custody during an election audit. FINDING 5: The audit did not address the importance of electronic logs as data to be evaluated during an audit of election records. |
To assess the sufficiency of BOE’s efforts to establish and provide training to the county, city, and township officials who are responsible for conducting elections | Sufficient, with exceptions | FINDING 4: Required post-election audit training was not completed by approximately 52% of county clerks and 59% of other county election officials who had not viewed relevant post-election audit training webinars or videos. | Insufficient, with malfeasance | FINDING 6: Funding intended for training was re-purposed by MI SoS. |
FINDINGS
FINDING 1: Poor audit data integrity.
The actual number of votes cast in the November 3, 2020 election per the statement of votes and the Michigan Secretary of State is 5,579,317. The Auditor General stated that 5,533,818 votes were cast. That figure is not even sufficient to account for the number of votes cast for President, which was 5,539,302. There is a discrepancy of 45,499 ballots. This discrepancy brings into question all other numerical conclusions brought forward in their report as it questions the source of data used. The fact that they used BOE queries from the QVF to arrive at their numbers highlights a material deficiency in the quality of the QVF data and the quality of assertions made by the Auditor General on the basis of this data.
FINDING 2: MI SoS violated state statute regarding the integrity of the QVF data.
MCL 168.509q requires that voting history data be maintained for 5 years. The Auditor General analysis of the QVF data revealed that 45,499 voters from the 2020 General Election were not retained in the QVF. This also indicates a potential significant overvote in the 2020 election that provides substantive grounds for decertification of the 2020 General Election. This is a material deficiency.